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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to examine the impact of female board members on firm 
performance by focusing on Spanish companies. We are interested in Spain because 
despite being the second country to implement legislative actions on this topic, its 
proportion of women in the boardroom remains below the European average.  
Previous empirical evidence is mixed, finding a positive, negative or no relationship 
between the number of women directors and economic gains. We perform OLS and 
panel data regression models by using a sample of 36 firms listed on the Mercado 
Continuo Español’s stock market, over the period 2011-2015. We find that there is a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between ROA or Tobin’s Q and the 
female on board variable, which indicates that women directors can positively influence 
business results. 
 
Keywords: Financial Performance, Gender-Diverse Boards, Women Directors, Firm 
Value, Female on Board. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ..................................................................................................................... 3 
1. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 5 
2. REVIEW OF EXISTING THEORIES AND EVIDENCE ....................................... 7 
2.1 Theoretical background .......................................................................................... 7 
2.1.1 Hypothesis development ................................................................................... 7 
2.1.2 Theoretical perspectives of women on boards ............................................... 10 
2.2  Review of empirical literature ......................................................................... 12 
2.2.1 US ................................................................................................................... 12 
2.2.2 Europe ............................................................................................................ 13 
2.2.3 Spain ............................................................................................................... 15 
2.3  Institutional framework .................................................................................... 17 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS .......................................................................................... 22 
3.1 Data analysis ......................................................................................................... 22 
3.1.1 Data collection ............................................................................................... 22 
3.1.2 Variable definition.......................................................................................... 22 
3.1.3 Descriptive statistics ...................................................................................... 24 
3.1.4 Trends ............................................................................................................. 25 
3.2 Methodology ......................................................................................................... 33 
3.3 Results and discussion .......................................................................................... 34 
4. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................ 40 
5. BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................... 42 
APPENDIX .................................................................................................................... 49 
Appendix 1: EU countries regulation of gender balance on corporate boards ........... 49 
Appendix 2: Variable definition ................................................................................. 51 
Appendix 3: Firms in the sample sorted by sector ...................................................... 52 
 
5 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Board gender diversity has become a widely discussed topic within corporate 
governance. Despite there has been a decisive trend to promote women at top 
management positions and some advances have been achieved, a vast majority of 
boardrooms are still composed of male directors (Jourová, 2016). 
Spain was the second country to set out legislative actions that fostered the 
incorporation of more female members at executive levels, but the fraction is currently 
still low if compared to other European countries. On the contrary, Norway and other 
early adopters have recorded outstanding figures since the enactment of their respective 
policies (Berger, Kick and Schaeck, 2014). In this context, the need to investigate the 
effects of this legal implementation has become crucial; more concretely, the financial 
impact of having Women On Corporate Boards (WOCB hereafter) is one of the issues 
that have attracted growing research interest in recent years, but no homogenous results 
have been concluded yet. 
According to previous literature, there are several channels predicting a positive effect 
against a few stating the opposite. For instance, it is said that women can contribute to 
decision-making because more diverse insights can be considered, though that might 
sometimes lead to higher coordination costs. Similarly, some theories address the 
existence of a positive relationship between gender-diverse boards and financial 
performance (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013; Terjesen, Sealy and Singh, 2009). Furthermore, 
some authors such as Smith, Smith and Verner (2005) and Campbell and Mínguez-Vera 
(2008) show empirical evidence supporting these arguments. Nonetheless, other 
researchers claim that there exists a negative relationship (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012); 
whereas Adams and Ferreira (2009) and Carter, D’Souza, Simkins and Simpson (2010) 
find no connection. Recently, Laffarga, Pilar and Reguera-Alvarado (2015) have found 
a positive relationship based on a Spanish sample too, and they attribute it to the fact 
that women are more risk-averse than men, as they tend to propose less aggressive and 
more sustainable investment strategies. However, it is worth noticing that their sample 
relates to a period prior to the introduction of legal measures that foster gender diversity 
in boards by the Spanish government, so we take a more recent one. 
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Under this framework, this study provides new evidence on the relationship between an 
increased fraction of women in the boardroom and firm performance. Our objective is to 
analyze whether the presence of female board members positively affects financial 
outcomes. Hence, we minimize endogeneity by employing panel data methodology 
when running the regression models. As we are especially interested in the Spanish 
case, we use a dataset of companies listed on the Mercado Continuo Español’s stock 
market during the period 2011-2015. Overall, our results suggest that having WOCB in 
Spain is positively associated with financial performance measured by ROA, and in 
general also by Tobin’s Q. An outstanding finding though is that this only holds when 
we account for omitted variables in the previous literature, such as board specific skills. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. The theoretical part is split into two main 
sections. The first one consists of the theoretical background, including the main 
assumptions and theories advocating the existence of the gender diversity-performance 
and of the gender diversity- risk taking relationship. The second one is the review of the 
empirical evidence, synthetized by three main geographical areas. Next, an overview of 
the enacted legislation concerning WOCB across countries is provided, as well as the 
evolution of results in Europe. In the empirical analysis we focus on the gender 
diversity-performance relationship. This practical part is divided into three main 
sections: in the first one we analyze the dataset and identify some trends, while in the 
second we explain the followed methodology to obtain the results, which are exhibited 
in the last section. Finally, we provide a conclusion for the thesis, as well as the 
consulted bibliography and further information in the appendix. 
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2. REVIEW OF EXISTING THEORIES AND 
EVIDENCE 
2.1 Theoretical background 
The board of directors is one of the most influential governance mechanisms in an 
organization as regards strategic decision-making. Among their large range of functions, 
the most relevant ones comprise: “monitoring and controlling managers, providing 
information and counsel to managers, monitoring compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations, and linking the corporation to the external environment” (Carter et al., pp. 
398, 2010). Therefore, the composition of the board is expected to affect the overall 
performance of a firm, which might be influenced by corporate risk-taking.  
The role of gender-diverse boards has recently been given a special focus when it comes 
to research on this relationship, which suggests the willingness and importance to figure 
out whether this assumption holds. Due to this reason, our theoretical section 
concentrates on investigating the effect of female board members on both corporate 
risk-taking and economic results. 
2.1.1 Hypothesis development 
After careful review of previous literature, we identified several channels predicting a 
positive and negative effect. More concretely, six factors correspond to potential 
benefits for having WOCB, whereas just three relate to potential costs.  
 Advantages 
1. Attract external talents  “Women directors are role models who inspire others” 
(Terjesen et al., pp 328, 2009). As stated in Marinova, Plantenga and Remery 
(2010), research based on institutional legitimacy theory
1
 claims that the number of 
female top managers may influence positively the career development of women in 
lower positions, as it involves attracting well qualified candidates from sources 
different than the usual ones and reduces the influence of old boys’ network (Rose, 
2007).  
                                                          
1 A theory at the firm’s level which claims that there is a positive relationship between female corporate board 
members and overall female workers in a company (Terjesen et al., 2009). 
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2. Eliminate tokenism2  Tokenism is likely to take place whenever there is just one 
woman or one member of a minority group, as the token members may feel isolation 
and pressure to adopt stereotyped roles (Terjesen et al., 2009). According to some 
studies, “a critical mass is necessary to realize fully the benefits of diversity on 
corporate boards” (Packel and Rhode, pp. 409, 2015). Hence, gender diversity in the 
boardroom contributes to increase transparency of selection, by demonstrating to 
lower-level employees that the chance to fulfill highest positions in the firm depends 
only on their respective skills and qualifications rather than on other variables 
(Rose, 2007).  
3. Improve company image and stock value  Given the current trend of socially 
responsible investments, investors are encouraged to consider gender equality in the 
boardroom as a positive variable. As Laffarga et al. advocate, the consequences are 
that “the economic results, the media visibility, and the demonstration of 
commitments with respect to social and ethical concerns, will boost and result in a 
higher demand of stocks and an increase in their price” (pp.2, 2015; Adams, Grey 
and Nowland, 2011). Moreover, Adams and Ferreira (2009) claim that the more 
gender-diverse the board is the more equity-based compensation in the company. 
Hence, appointing women in the boardrooms may result in an enhancement of the 
company’s reputation because it sends positive signals to stakeholders such as 
consumers, suppliers and the community (Rose, 2007).  
4. New insights and creativity  A balanced proportion of women and men in 
leadership positions can positively contribute to problem-solving because more 
diverse alternatives and perspectives are evaluated: “By taking a broader view, the 
board will have a better understanding of the complexities of the business 
environment and thus improve decision-making” (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 
pp.440, 2008). Furthermore, creative ideas and innovation may arise as a result of 
having access to a wider range of information sources (Ferreira, 2010).  
5. Positive influence on men’s behavior  Research from Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) not only argues that female directors have better attendance records than 
males, but that males’ attendance is likely to improve the more gender-diverse the 
board is. Moreover, they also claim that female directors are mainly associated with 
monitoring committees rather than with other types, such as nomination and 
                                                          
2 Applied to the business context, tokenism is the practice of hiring a person who belongs to a minority group in order 
to prevent criticism against the company image and prove employees are treated fairly (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). 
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compensation committees. Overall, their conclusions suggest women positively 
influence men’s behavior and higher efforts to monitoring tend to be observed in 
gender-diverse boards. 
6. Orientation towards Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)  Women possess 
some traits which may enhance board oversight of firm strategy, such as sensitivity 
towards others and the ability to handle with interests of multiple parties (Huse and 
Nielsen, 2010). It is not surprising then that gender-diverse boards achieve more 
effective communication levels among the board and its stakeholders. For instance, 
they emphasize both customer and employee satisfaction, innovation and gender 
equality measures (Terjesen et al., 2009). In this context, it is worth highlighting that 
female directors are often associated with sectors in close proximity to final 
customers and soft managerial areas, such as CSR, Marketing and Human 
Resources (Gimeno, Mangas and Mateos de Cabo, 2007; Huddleston, Runyan and 
Swinney, 2006; Rao and Tilt, 2016).  
 
 Disadvantages 
1. Coordination costs  Despite heterogeneous opinions may turn out in better 
quality decisions, coordinating and reaching consensus can be more time-
consuming. Therefore, if the company operates in a quick-response market these 
costs may not offset the advantages of a diverse board, and they would rather lead to 
a less efficient decision-making body and competitive behaviour (Marinova et al., 
2010; Smith et al., 2005). 
2. Conflict and lack of communication   “A more diverse board may be in greater 
risk of being influenced by directors with distinct personal and professional 
agendas” (Ferreira, pp.229, 2010). Indeed, dissimilarities in interests often involve 
conflict and a reduction in group cohesiveness. Similarly, information flows may be 
harmed when members do not share the same values (Packel and Rhode, 2015). 
3. Choosing inadequate directors  It is often argued that not only demographic 
characteristics such as age, gender or ethnicity should be taken into account when it 
comes to equality in the board. In the context of gender quotas, relying just on 
demographical factors is sometimes seen as a drawback because other relevant 
backgrounds such as education, qualifications and training are not considered. For 
example, it is said there is a short supply of qualified females who could join top 
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executive positions because they are likely to be younger and less experienced in the 
business field than their male counterparts
3
 (Ferreira, 2010; Terjesen et al., 2009).  
2.1.2 Theoretical perspectives of women on boards 
Terjesen et al. (2009) summarized several theoretical contributions on this topic and 
provided a better grasp in WOCB’s relationship with financial performance by 
describing two main theories at the firm’s level: 
 Agency theory  It explains the relationship between a principal (e.g. shareholder) 
and its agent (e.g. directors or managers) by assuming outside directors are good 
monitors for shareholders’ interests because they work separately from inside 
directors (Terjesen et al., 2009). In this sense, costs such as asymmetric information, 
opportunistic behavior and incomplete contracts can be significantly reduced with 
an adequate board of directors, which aligns the interests of both managers and 
shareholders (Laffarga et al., 2015). Therefore, it suggests diverse directors, who 
may be better monitors of management as they are able to consider a larger range of 
perspectives, influence firm value. Adams and Ferreira (2009) advocate this theory 
by arguing that female directors are austere monitors and more active, which in turn 
impacts corporate governance. However, whether a tighter monitoring leads to 
positive or negative outcomes is still questionable, so this theory is not a good 
indicator for WOCB’s relationship with financial performance (Carter et al., 2010).  
 Resource dependency  Highly supported by Carter et al. (2010), this theory 
states diversity in the board improves information due to the uniqueness of its 
source. It assumes better financial performance is achieved thanks to the 
appointment of different corporate directors, who are selected in order to maximize 
access to critical resources and connections (Ferreira, 2010).  In fact, they are used 
as a linkage mechanism to expand not only relations with stakeholders, such as 
competitors and customers (Funch, Munch-Madsen and Rose, 2013), but also 
knowledge about the industry and finance prospects (Laffarga et al., 2015). Overall, 
this linkage involves four main advantages: firstly, it may provide the company with 
useful information; secondly, it is an adequate channel for communication purposes; 
thirdly, it obtains commitments of support from important elements of the 
environment; and fourthly, it legitimizes companies (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). 
                                                          
3 Evidence on women human capital theory indicates they are just as well qualified as men in terms of education level 
and other important qualities, but less likely to have significant experience as business experts (Terjesen et al., 2009). 
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Finally, this theory justifies why female directors are usually found in customer-
oriented business, as gender diversity not only enhances stakeholders’ relations but 
also firm’s reputation and performance (Dang and Nguyen, 2016). 
 
Additionally, some authors such as Carter et al. (2010) and Lückerath-Rovers (2013) 
aim at demonstrating a more solid and realistic possibility of this link. For this reason, 
they develop an interdisciplinary approach by focusing as well on theories at the 
individual level, such as human capital, and at the board level, such as social 
psychology. 
 Human capital  Related to resource dependency, this theory explores how education, 
skills, and experience of employees can affect organizations (Carter et al., 2010).  
Because gender diversity involves unique access to resources, firm value may increase.   
 Social psychology  It predicts board diversity can positively influence decision-
making dynamics, and consequently business performance, by encouraging 
miscellaneous thinking, in spite of the boundless power of majority status individuals 
(Carter et al., 2010). Nevertheless, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) claim that 
divergent opinions might turn out to be slower and less effective. 
 
On the other hand, no theories are related with female board members and corporate 
risk-taking. Rather, Faccio, Marchica and Murac (2016) advocate the existence of three 
main channels, which will be further discussed in the review of empirical literature: 
1. Firm risk  This hypothesis derives from the fact that a considerable number of 
female CEOs tend to be hired by companies with low leverage trends or those 
willing to undertake less risk. Therefore, women in top executive positions such as 
corporate boards are often associated with risk-averse decisions and firms.  
2. Self-selection  As causality can run in either one direction or the other, it could 
also be that women are prone to work in low risk or more stable firms. 
3. Biological and/or environment-driven factors  Different risk attitudes can arise 
depending on more complex elements, such as preferences or overconfidence. 
Hence, corporate risk-taking can be explained by external forces affecting gender, 
which build and model the framework for a given behavior. 
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To conclude, whereas both resource dependence and human capital theory indicate there 
may exist the possibility of a positive relationship between gender diversity on 
corporate boards and financial performance depending on the situation, agency and 
social psychological theory do not provide a clear support for it. In fact, there are 
limited empirical analysis attempting to clarify whether the sign could be negative or 
positive (Carter et al., 2010; Lückerath-Rovers, 2013). Moreover, the three channels 
regarding women risk-taking point out the difficulty in predicting the direction of 
causality, due to factors beyond the reach of the internal business scenario. 
 
2.2  Review of empirical literature 
Evidence on whether WOCB positively or negatively affect company performance 
varies across countries, and the same trend is found for studies related to risk-taking.  
To provide a better grasp of the wide empirical background, this section organizes the 
literature in three main geographical areas: US, Europe and Spain.  
 
To begin with, it is worth examining previous empirical studies from the US, as most 
research on this topic has been based on data extracted from this country and its biggest 
firms. Secondly, the case of Europe has gained more interest during the recent years, so 
a large extent of contributions mainly based on Nordic countries help to understand 
different dynamics. Finally, as this project aims at examining the Spanish case, a special 
focus is given to the existing literature in this country. 
2.2.1 US 
 Performance 
Non-peer-reviewed publications such as Catalyst and The McKinsey report are among 
the first to address the existence, although not statistically significant, of a positive 
relationship between female top managers and company performance (Lückerath-
Rovers, 2013). Subsequently, Huddleston et al. (2006) collect the results from small 
business entrepreneurs in one Mid-western state and find that female business owners, 
both at male-dominated and female-dominated business types
4
, register superior 
business performance when their education is beyond the high school level.  
                                                          
4 “Retail and service industries account for more than 80 percent of female entrepreneurs’ fields of operation” 
(Huddleston et al., 2006). 
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On the other hand, Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue too much monitoring
5
 can reduce 
shareholder value when companies have few takeover defenses. Therefore, there is not 
enough evidence that regulations enforcing quotas for women on boards lead to a higher 
firm performance. Finally, according to Carter et al. (2010) appointing women and 
ethnic minorities to corporate boards does not imply any significant effect on 
performance, so again they underpin gender quotas do not seem to be the convenient 
way of improving business results.  
 Risk-taking 
Huang and Kisgen (2013) predict male executives are more overconfident than females 
because the last ones are, among other findings, less likely to make early acquisitions or 
issue debt. In addition, Gonzalez and Sila (2014) assert that firm-level equity risk can be 
substantially reduced the more male directors interact with female directors. Thus, they 
suggest WOCB can positively impact firm decisions and stability in spite of their 
minority status. Similarly, greater gender diversity on the board together with other 
factors such as a smaller board size, greater board independence and lower 
concentration of institutional ownership, involves a lower default risk according to Cao, 
Davalos, Feroz and Leng (2015).  
 
Nonetheless, Adams and Ragunathan (2013) not only state that banks with a larger 
number of women on boards are more likely to be risk-lovers, but also that they show 
better performance records. In line with Adams and Funk’s (2012) argument, they 
reflect risk-aversion research is misleading because it is usually based on general 
population samples, while they find that the pool of female corporate leaders in finance 
appears to be very different from other women. 
2.2.2 Europe
6
 
 Performance 
Smith et al. (2005) perform a panel data study of 2,500 of the largest Danish companies 
and find that a higher fraction of women among top executives and on boards of 
                                                          
5 Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010) also support women are more oriented towards monitoring by confirming 
the tendency to find them in diversified companies, which devote more time to this activity, rather than to strategic 
issues as in growing companies. 
6
 Spain is excluded from this section but it is explained in detail afterwards, as it allows to highlight previous 
evidence on the country of interest. 
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directors is likely to boost financial outcomes. Some remarkable traits are that this 
positive relationship mainly takes place when female managers have university 
education or they are elected by the staff. Furthermore, businesses with a clear 
customer-orientation (e.g. service and retail industry) and with at least one top executive 
female possess a larger share of women among the overall staff than do others. More 
recently, Lückerath-Rovers (2013) shows that companies with women directors on their 
boards perform better than those without from a Dutch perspective, and associates it to 
resource dependency theory. Similarly, a longitudinal analysis of 91 Danish 
municipalities carried out by Opstrup and Villadsen (2014) indicates gender diversity in 
the top management team leads to better economic performance as long as integration 
and discretion measures at the group’s level, such as teamwork, freedom of judgment 
and shared responsibilities, are encouraged by the organizational structure. 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) provide evidence of a 
negative association from a Norwegian point of view, given the lower job experience of 
women. Hence, they claim mandatory board member gender quotas in this country 
resulted in a performance deterioration because corporate leaders were not freely chosen 
as requested by resource dependency theory.  
Unlike the previous studies, Oxelheim, Randøy and Thomsen (2006) suggest gender-
diverse boards have no impact on stock market valuation and profitability when 
investigating a sample of the largest companies in Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway and 
Sweden). Despite no negative financial outcomes are found, value destruction may arise 
if gender diversity is aimed at expanding the board’s size. In this paper, they also reveal 
Denmark is the country with the lowest share of WOCB and older members. Consistent 
with this, Rose (2007) shows no substantial linkage between educational, ethnical and 
gender-diverse boards and firm performance when examining only listed Danish firms. 
Later on, Marinova et al. (2010) explore the Dutch and Danish business scenario and 
come up with no clear evidence for the concerned relationship, while Huse and Nielsen 
(2010) report the same results when using a Norwegian sample, though they do find 
another linkage between WOCB and board control. Reinforcing these findings, Funch et 
al. (2013) use a sample of the major listed firms in the Nordic countries and Germany to 
suggest again gender diversity has no effect on corporate performance and it can 
negatively influence it only if board’s size is expanded, whilst homogeneous ethnicity 
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on boards appears to improve it. Latterly, Dang and Nguyen (2016) confirm the impact 
varies from positive to negative depending on the chosen performance measure, based 
on data from French listed companies. As in Adams and Ferreira (2009), they also find 
that female directors may damage company value when there are strong governance 
mechanisms and high profitability. 
 Risk-taking 
Parrota and Smith (2013) advocate, although not providing any causal effect, that 
female-led firms in Denmark tend to show less volatile investments, return on equity, 
profits and sales compared to those run by males. This is consistent with Faccio et al. 
(2016) results, who demonstrate female CEOs are usually associated with less risky 
firms in their large sample of European companies. Some of their findings include 
financing and investment choices are not as risky as the ones taken by their male 
counterparts, as well as transitions from male to female CEOs in a specific firm are 
likely to diminish risk-taking. Additionally, highly profitable and older firms tend to 
hire more women according to their research.  
 
On the other hand, Adams and Funk (2012) document women directors in Sweden are 
slightly more risk-loving than both other women in the general population and male 
directors. One of the most distinguishable traits of this sample is that female managers 
seem to be more open to change and environmentally and socially concerned than the 
other groups tested. This is mainly due to self-selection, as women who choose to be 
managers are considerably different from all the rest. Moreover, evidence from Berger 
et al. (2014) reveals risk-taking increases when there is a higher proportion of young 
and female executives, but declines when appointing people possessing PhD degrees. In 
their empirical analysis, women directors in Germany self-select into banks which 
already have a female CEO due to the glass ceiling effect: career growth is difficult for 
women and therefore means they suffer from a higher risk exposure.  
2.2.3 Spain 
 Performance 
Focusing on a Spanish context, Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) demonstrate that 
firm value may be positively influenced by a right balance on board gender diversity 
rather than by the presence of WOCB itself. Furthermore, they prove that reverse 
causality does not hold and Spanish investors are willing to invest more in companies 
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with female directors. Later on, they analyze the short-term and long-term stock market 
reaction to the appointment of female directors by using an event study and the system 
GMM estimation procedure respectively. Because the market value of firms is 
positively affected, they suggest that female directors add value (Campbell and 
Mínguez-Vera, 2010). In line with these findings, García (2010) shows business 
technical efficiency increases the more heterogeneous the board is, whereas a study 
carried out by Apesteguia, Azmat and Iriberri (2012) advocates mixed teams in terms of 
gender show the highest performance and the best group dynamics. More recently, 
Martín-Ugedo and Mínguez-Vera (2014) examine SMEs in Spain and state that the 
presence of females on boards leads to higher economic gains. In addition, in their full 
sample women directors tend to be found in firms with substantial value and when a 
family member is a shareholder. Lastly, Laffarga et al. (2015) support gender quotas by 
also documenting a positive relationship between WOCB and financial results based on 
a sample of 125 non-financial companies listed on the Madrid Stock Exchange during 
2005-2009.   
Nevertheless, Martín and Mínguez-Vera (2011) report a negative impact on economic 
gains when analyzing non-financial SMEs. They also show that women on boards are 
usually found in family firms and those which have a financial institution as the main 
shareholder, as well as in firms with less debt, more assets and larger boards. 
Opposite to the previous findings, Gallego, García and Rodríguez (2010) claim that 
board gender diversity does not necessarily influence company performance. By using 
several market and accounting measures for a sample of the largest 117 firms, no 
significant relationship is observed. 
 Risk-taking 
There exists little research on this topic based on the Spanish market, but the results 
point out that women are considerable more risk-averse than men. 
Some interesting findings can be attributed to Karande and Zinkhan (2002). In their 
paper, they do not explicitly test directors, rather they compare a Spanish and American 
sample of MBA students. Despite the first one turns out to be less risk-averse than the 
second, women in both nationalities tend to be more conservative in risky scenarios.  
Hernández, Martín-Ugedo and Mínguez-Vera (2015) provide similar evidence when 
examining both CEOs and board members of small start-up firms, finding that debt 
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financing is likely to diminish as the presence of females increases. Therefore, they 
conclude gender-diverse boards are more stable because they allow the company to 
reduce its cost of the debt and increase its debt maturity. 
 
In conclusion, most of previous research in the geographical areas of interest suggest 
WOCB have a positive impact on firm performance, with some exceptions drawing 
negative or neutral conclusions. As regards female risk attitudes, there are mixed results 
according to North-American and overall European studies, whereas Spanish evidence 
underpins women exhibit risk-averse behaviour. This ambiguity may be due to the 
differing time periods and institutional contexts. Besides, estimation methods for 
financial performance and risk-taking seem to vary and there may exist other 
unobserved factors. 
2.3  Institutional framework  
Country characteristics and institutional environment play an important role for shaping 
both corporate governance regulation and women directors’ features. As observed in 
Terjesen et al. (2009), countries with a larger proportion of women in the boardroom 
tend to have females in senior management and legislature levels, as well as smaller 
gender pay gaps. Then, if a given country exhibits difficulties for women in pushing 
forward to executive positions, there is room for its female directors being much more 
risk-lovers than in others (Adams and Funk, 2012). 
To promote the representation of WOCB, enacted legislation across countries generally 
consists of a set gender quota (33–50 %), time frame (3–5 years), and sanctions for non-
compliance (Aguilera, Lorenz and Terjesen, 2015).  
In 2012, the European Parliament proclaimed a legislative initiative aimed at the 
underrepresented sex filling 40% of supervisory and executive positions of European 
firms listed on stock exchanges by 2020 (Berger et al., 2014; Jourová, 2016). 
In 2006, Norway became the first country in the world to set such a law, demanding this 
quantitative target to all its public-limited firms by 2008 and forcing them to dissolve 
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otherwise
7
. As of today, this strong penalty has been already removed because the effect 
of the gender balance regulations has been full (Izquierdo, Möltner and Morten, 2016).  
In Denmark, a new rule concerning approximately 1100 of its biggest private and public 
companies
8
 came into force in April 2013. The covered companies are obliged to self-
regulate and set their own targets and time frame as in Sweden, by providing 
information on the reported gender inequality in both the board of directors and other 
management levels. It is worth taking into account that no punishment arises in case of 
non-compliance with the committed target figure, whilst SMEs, which account for a 
large proportion of the businesses as in Spain, are exempt of applying this policy 
(Hastings, 2013). 
Similarly, the Netherlands enforced another self-regulated and “soft9” law but 
requesting a 30% target. More recently, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece 
and Italy have adopted this regulation in their respective corporate governance codes, 
though the measures and conditions vary because the European Commission, to some 
extent, allows the member countries to “flexibly” implement it (See Appendix 1). 
Other countries such as Australia, China and India have also started disclosing gender 
diversity policies to foster the participation of females in executive levels (Rao and Tilt, 
2016). 
Focusing on Spain, it was the second country in the world to set out gender balance 
legislation on corporate boards by introducing the so-called ‘‘Law of Equality’’ 
(Organic Law 3/2007) (Izquierdo et al., 2016).  It consisted of a comply-or-explain type 
law calling for public limited companies with 250 or more employees to reach the 40% 
target by 2015, including both executives and non-executive boards (Rao and Tilt, 
2016). However, the figure was not achieved due to the fact it did not apply to SMEs 
firms, which represent 99% of all Spanish businesses and account for 80% of 
employment (Baixauli-Soler, Lucas-Pérez, Martín-Ugedo, Mínguez-Vera and Sánchez-
                                                          
7 This implied many companies decided to either leave the country or shift to private. In 2009, the number of public 
limited firms in Norway was less than 70 percent of the number in 2001. In contrast, the number of private limited 
firms, hence not affected by the quota, rose by over 30 percent (Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). 
8 “If exceeding two of these criteria in two consecutive financial years: Balance sheet total of DKK 143 million; 
Revenue of DKK 286 million; or Average number of employees of 250” (Hastings, P., pp 71, 2013). 
9
 Soft mechanism which does not entail any statutory penalty for firms in the event of non-compliance. It can also be 
referred to as a “comply-or-explain” type law. 
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Marín, 2015), and it was attempted at stimulating companies to develop their own 
gender parity policies rather than at imposing sanctions
10
. Consequently, in 2014 the 
Spanish government decided to shift towards a “flexi-quota” in an attempt of emulating 
the Nordic behavior, characterized by a successful voluntary style. In this new 
framework, the 40% compulsory figure has been substituted by a 30% recommended 
quota which does not apply anymore to all large companies, but just to listed ones.  
In other words, firms are now obliged to give convenient explanations in case the 
recommended quota is not achieved, as in Denmark, but without setting a number or 
any objective within a specific time reference (Izquierdo et al., 2016). 
 
Consequences in Europe 
Figure 1 exhibits that, as of April 2016, WOCB belonging to the largest publicly-listed 
companies in the EU-28 Member States account for an average 23%. Currently, just ten 
countries (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom) record females for at least a quarter of their board 
members. 
Figure 1. Percentage of female board members of the largest listed firms in the EU-
28. April 2016. 
 
Source: made by the author, based on data from the European Commission 
                                                          
10 “In May 2012, an award was given to 30 companies including Acciona Ingeniería, S.A., Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria, S.A., CaixaBank, S.A. and Ernst & Young, S.L. Moreover, certain Autonomous Regions also established 
awards for companies that comply with local equality regulations” (Hastings, P., pp 98, 2013). 
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As observed in Figure 2, the 2010-2016 raise in the share of women on boards is 
significantly bigger than the one in the years before the application of the policy by the 
member states
11
. Despite the most successful change figures seem to be achieved in 
countries which have already adopted the EU regulation in their National Corporate 
Governance Codes (e.g. Italy +25.5 pp) (Jourová, 2016), Spain is surprisingly growing 
at a very slow pace, roughly reaching 17% female directors in 2014
12
. Thus, Spain is 
characterized by a slight evolution on incorporating female members in the boardrooms, 
with yearly outcomes far below the respective EU average. 
Figure 2. Percentage of female board members in Spain and the EU-28. 
Years 2010-2016. 
 
Source: made by the author, based on data from the European Commission 
 
Turning to the Nordic countries (See Figure 3), the results are overall remarkedly 
successful and surpass by far the EU average in all cases. In Finland and Norway, the 
fraction of female board members has been kept at figures close to 29% and 42% during 
the last six years. By contrast, in Sweden and Denmark it has steadily risen, reporting 
26% and 18% in 2010 while 33% and 27% respectively in 2016. These are just modest 
growths if compared to Iceland though, which shows a variation from 16% to 44% 
during the concerned period.  
                                                          
11 From 2003 to 2010 an average increase of 0.5 pp/year, against 2.1 pp year from 2010 to 2016 (Jourová, V., 2016). 
12 The deadline to reach the 40% gender quota was 2015, but in 2014 the figures were undoubtedly low. 
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Figure 3. Percentage of female board members of larger publicly listed companies in 
Nordic countries. Years 2010-2015. 
 
Source: made by the author, based on the Nordic co-operation’s database. 
 
However, it is worth considering that when it comes to board presidents, Denmark is the 
only Nordic state which still does not have any women, whilst the EU average has 
slightly evolved from 3% to 7% (See Figure 4). According to Berner, Ellersgaard and 
Larsen (2016), since the enactment of the national Danish legislation in 2013, less than 
one fifth of those who have climbed the corporate ladder is a female, and they seem to 
be concentrated just on the biggest companies of the financial sector.  
Figure 4. Percentage of female board presidents of larger publicly listed companies in 
Nordic countries. Years 2010-2015. 
 
Source: made by the author, based on the Nordic co-operation’s database 
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3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section we analyze empirically the relationship between WOCB and firm 
performance. We will first describe the database that we use; we will next present the 
methodology. Finally, we will discuss our results. 
3.1 Data analysis 
3.1.1 Data collection  
Our data is collected from Thomson Reuter’s Datastream, a database which contains 
firm performance and corporate governance information for companies all over the 
globe. After careful review of all possible populations, we decide to take the firms 
included in the Mercado Continuo Español’s stock market, ordered by highest to lowest 
level of turnover. However, the final sample is limited to 36 firms
13
 because of missing 
data related to the number of female on board, which is the variable of main interest. 
Among these, it is worth noticing 29 companies are listed in the IBEX-35, and that we 
effectively checked gender data related to the boards of directors was not available for 
the remaining ones in the index. 
This report is focused on recent trends concerning WOCB in Spanish companies; hence, 
we decide to take a time series request consisting of the last available 5 years. That is, 
we download information for the end of the years 2011 until 2015.  
As previously mentioned, our empirical section just concentrates on the gender 
diversity-firm performance link, so we do not take into account corporate risk-taking 
figures. In total, we obtain 1342
14
 board-firm-year observations for the selected sample.  
3.1.2 Variable definition 
This section provides the description of our variables, which are synthetized in 
Appendix 2. After careful review of the missing values, we decide to consider just those 
                                                          
13 Unlike other authors (e.g. Adams and Ferreira (2009); Rose (2007)), we do not exclude companies in the finance 
and insurance industry due to several reasons. First, financial firms are usually excluded because the high leverage 
that is normal in this sector would probably indicate financial distress for non-financial firms. However, we do not 
focus on leverage. Second, as Campbell and Minguez-Vera (2008) show, the financial sector is by far the leading one 
regarding announcements of female appointments to board of directors. Finally, since this industry represents as 
much as 25% of our sample, excluding these companies would lead to a substantial limitation of our sample size. We 
are nevertheless aware that, as mentioned by Rose (2007), these firms are subject to special accounting standards, 
thus results should be interpreted with caution. 
14 See Table 1. 
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variables that are not significantly affected by this issue. All in all, we take 8 variables 
and we group them in 3 main categories. 
 Independent variable 
Because our study focuses on women situation in corporate boards, Female On Board is 
the explanatory variable. It is automatically calculated in Datastream by computing the 
total percentage of female directors in each firm’s board, which fits with previous 
literature such as Laffarga et al. (2015). As mentioned previously, just 36 companies 
provide information about it, so this is the variable that sets our sample and therefore 
our framework for the analysis. 
 Dependent variables 
According to Adams and Ferreira (2009), Carter et al. (2010), Campbell and Mínguez-
Vera (2008) and Laffarga et al. (2015) among others, financial performance can be 
measured by 2 main proxies: ROA and Tobin’s Q.  
1. ROA  Return On Assets measures operating performance from an accounting 
perspective relative to the company’s assets (Carter et al., 2010).  This variable is 
available in Datastream as a percentage, and it is computed in a different way 
depending on whether the firm is a bank, an insurance company or any other firm in 
the financial sector
15. However, the general formula comprises the company’s Net 
Income over its Total Assets, which Datastream identifies as (Net Income – Bottom 
Line + ((Interest Expense on Debt-Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / Average 
of Last Year's and Current Year’s Total Assets * 100. 
2. Tobin’s Q  Contrary to ROA, this indicator is not based on any accounting 
prospect. Rather, it is said to be one of the best proxies for competitive advantage 
because it indicates the market valuation of the firm. It relates a company’s market 
value to its physical assets, measuring the market’s forecast for future earnings 
(Laffarga et al., 2015). Therefore, when Tobin’s Q is high it means the financial 
performance increases, and we compute it as the sum of Market Capitalisation plus 
Total Liabilities
16
, over Total Assets (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 2008). In other 
words, it corresponds to the sum of Book Value of Debt plus Total Market 
Capitalisation, over the Book Value of Equity plus the Book Value of Debt (Rose, 
2007). These are all provided by Datastream, except for the Total Liabilities, which 
                                                          
15 See Appendix 2 for detailed formulas. 
16 Due to the lack of data related to non-financial debt, the Total Labilities just include financial liabilities. 
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can be found by subtracting Total Assets minus Book Value of Equity. We calculate 
this last one by multiplying the Book Value of Equity per share times the Total 
Number of Shares. 
 Control variables 
Within this group, we distinguish firm and board characteristics. Each of them consists 
of 2 and 3 variables respectively, which are further explained in Appendix 2.  
These variables have already been used by some renowned authors, such as Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) and Carter et al. (2010), but we download an additional one which we 
find interesting and potentially related to our field of study. 
 -Firm characteristics:  
Fortunately, Datastream allows us to download not only common records such as Firm 
Size (in terms of asset value
17
), but also non-financial data such as the percentage of 
Women Employees.  
-Board characteristics:  
We also control for the total members on the board (Board Size) and the percentage of 
Independent Board Members. Finally, we include an additional variable displaying the 
percentage of board members with previous industry knowledge (Board Specific Skills).  
3.1.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 displays the Mean, Standard Deviation, Maximum and Minimum values for 
both financial performance and corporate governance variables. 
The standard deviation of the selected Key Performance Indicators (ROA and Tobin’s 
Q) shows our sample comprises variable financial outcomes. For instance, whereas 
there exist some companies with very low financial performance reporting negative 
minimum numbers, there are others in the opposite extreme with outstanding results.  
The rounded average number of female on board is just 15,21%, thus in line with the 
previously mentioned trends in section “Consequences in the EU”. Moreover, the fact 
that women employees in the sample represent roughly 36,92% on average reflects not 
even half of the staff appears to be a female, though there is some exception because the 
maximum value is 79,50%. 
Regarding board characteristics, they can be composed by 7 up to 22 members, who 
tend to be independent and with a considerable expertise on the sector. At the 
                                                          
17 Firm Size is expressed as the logarithm of total assets, as done in previous literature (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). 
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company’s level, on average firms have a size of 9,79 if measured by log assets, which 
corresponds to an asset value of 100.979,9 million euros.  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
 
3.1.4 Trends 
This section covers a selection of general trends for this specific sample. Different 
tables and graphs are made according to our data, but just the most relevant are 
explained below. 
As observed in Figure 5, the firm which on average shows the largest proportion of 
female on board across the concerned period is Red Eléctrica, which belongs to the 
energy sector. Prosegur, Acciona, Iberdrola and Inditex follow the subsequent leading 
positions, so at first glance it seems that activity sectors do not influence gender equality 
on boards (See Appendix 3 for detailed information about sectors). In the opposite 
extreme, some companies such as Gas Natural, Técnicas Reunidas or Cellnex report 0 
women in their respective boardrooms. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Number of observations Mean St.Dev. Min. Max.
Independent variable
Female On Board (%) 171 15,21 10,26 0,00 45,45
Dependent variables
ROA (%) 168 4,47 7,59 -19,28 41,87
Tobin's Q 171 1,53 1,27 0,77 7,86
Firm characteristics
Firm Size (thousands) 171 9,79 2,01 5,59 14,12
Women Employees (%) 159 36,92 15,62 9,32 79,50
Board Characteristics
Board Size 167 13,70 3,49 7,00 22,00
Independent Board Members (%) 165 42,37 18,82 9,09 88,89
Board Specific Skills (%) 170 38,67 15,94 8,33 100,00
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Figure 5. Average percentage of Female On Board for each firm (2011-2015). 
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
 
Focusing on the evolution by activity sectors (See Figure 6), the textile is the one 
displaying the uppermost results every single year. Actually, Inditex is the only 
company in this sample operating in the textile industry, so the assumptions related to 
the previous graph hold. Unlike the other ones, the proportion of women in the 
boardroom is constant (27,27%) and therefore still far from the maximum value found 
in the overall sample (45,45%). 
Most sectors, such as the Wind, Energy, Communications, Infrastructure, Finance and 
Insurance show increasing trends; whilst the Hospitality, Real Estate, Manufacturing 
and ITC disclose a slightly dropping and uneven pattern.  
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Figure 6. Evolution of Female On Board by Sector (2011-2015). 
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
 
Another outstanding trend is exhibited in Figure 7. Not only is the textile sector the one 
with the prevalent number of female board members, but also with the largest average 
number of women employees as of 2015. Thus, our data is consistent with previously 
mentioned hypothesis predicted by a wide variety of authors 
18
, who stated that women 
tend to be found in sectors operating close to end customers. By contrast, the wind 
industry records the second minimal proportion of female staff but one of the highest 
regarding female on board. Hence, assumptions stating that women holding top 
executive positions attract women employees do not seem to hold
19
. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 See page 9. Section “6. Orientation towards Corporate Social Responsibility”. 
19 See page 7. Section “1. Attract external talent”. 
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Figure 7. Average Women Employees by Sector in 2015. 
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
 
Regarding board skills and industry background (see Figure 8), some of the sectors with 
the greatest amount of WOCB also hold a top position in this category (e.g. Textile, 
Communications, Finance and Insurance). However, the trend is counterbalanced by the 
outcomes of Wind, Energy and ITC, so no hypothesis can be supported
20
. 
Figure 8. Average Board Specific Skills by Sector in 2015. 
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
                                                          
20 See page 9, Section “3. Choosing inadequate directors”. 
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As shown in Figure 9, women in the boardroom appear to be mostly concentrated on 
companies with a small board size (e.g. Red Eléctrica, Prosegur). In this sense, some of 
the previously mentioned hypothesis predicted by Oxelheim et al. (2006) and Funch et 
al. (2013), which stated that having more female with the intention of expanding board 
size could damage firm value, would fit.  
Figure 9. Board Size and Female On Board for each firm (2011-2015). 
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
 
Although it is soon to draw former conclusions, at first glance it seems that the amount 
of female on boards does not necessarily influence financial performance and vice 
versa, as observed below in Figure 10. 
Some of the companies sustaining the leading positions in terms of WOCB turn out to 
be the ones with the highest Return On Assets (e.g Inditex, Viscofan). Nonetheless, the 
case of Zardoya Otis clearly cancels out this trend, as it has a minor fraction of women 
in the boardroom but the biggest ROA. Therefore, outstanding performance from an 
accounting perspective appears to be independent from the number of women in the 
boardroom according to our data, which would reinforce several contributions from 
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researchers all over the globe
21
 characterized by supporting neither the resource 
dependency nor the human capital theory. 
Figure 10. Female On Board and ROA for each firm (2011-2015). 
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
 
From a market valuation’s point of view (see Figure 11), the trends are pretty similar 
and suggest as well that financial performance and female board members do not seem 
to be interconnected. 
Out of the top 5 companies in terms of female on board, just Inditex shows remarkable 
results, whilst the first 4 display quite low ones. Additionally, companies with a small 
share of women in the boardroom do not register a significant performance either. All 
these observations, together with the fact that Zardoya Otis registers again the peak for 
Tobin’s Q, lead us to think that the above-mentioned predictions could fit.  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, this association needs to be explained by means of more 
solid findings, so we cannot conclude the effect WOCB have on business results yet. 
 
 
                                                          
21 See page 12 “1.2 Review of empirical literature” 
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Figure 11. Female On Board and Tobin’s Q for each firm (2011-2015). 
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
 
Figure 12 provides a better grasp of the yearly average evolution of female on board and 
financial performance for all the firms during the concerned period.  
The share of female in the boardroom shows a modest increasing pattern, so our results 
are consistent with the data extracted from the European Commission in Figure 2. 
Similarly, Tobin’s Q is also growing throughout the years, even though in 2014 we 
appreciate a slight decline. This financial outline is pretty different from ROA though, 
which exhibits a decreasing trend until 2013 but a rising one afterwards, and therefore 
seems to be explained by the Spanish crisis effects. 
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Figure 12. Evolution of Female On Board and Financial Performance. 
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
 
Given that financial performance is measured differently for firms in the financial and 
insurance industry, in Figure 13 we check how financial performance relates to female 
on board focusing on 2 subsamples: finance and insurance, and the rest of the 
companies.  
On average, the financial and insurance sector disclose a superior number of WOCB but 
a poorer business performance than the other industries. Their low financial results 
might be due to the recent financial crisis together with the European sovereign debt 
crisis. Indeed, the Spanish banks were very exposed to the real estate bubble and the 
following mortgage defaults (Royo, Steinberg, Otero-Iglesias, 2016). The difference 
could also be due to the different accounting standards that financial firms are subject to 
(Rose, 2007).  
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Figure 13. Female On Board and Financial Performance by Sectors (2011-2015). 
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
 
3.2 Methodology 
We use two statistical methods to run the regressions in the software Stata: Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and panel data. This provides us with a more reliable picture, since 
longitudinal data allows us to control for hidden variables, thereby avoiding 
unobservable heterogeneity (Wooldridge, 2012). 
As highlighted by many influential authors, endogeneity and reverse causality must be 
addressed when examining the diversity-performance relationship of a set of companies 
over a given period of time (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 
2008; Carter et al., 2010; Laffarga et al., 2015). The first problem can be easily 
overcome by using panel data, which partly mitigates endogeneity concerns caused by 
omitted variables, such as unobservable firm or board characteristics. However, we are 
not able to control for reverse causality, due to the additional advanced techniques out 
of the scope for an undergraduate level, such as 2SLS and instrumental variables (IV).  
An estimation by fixed effects is performed whenever unobservable heterogeneity is 
correlated with the predictor variable, whilst the random effects methodology is 
undertaken whenever the effects are not correlated with the explanatory variable. For 
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each model, we select the most convenient estimation approach thanks to the Hausman 
test, which states as null hypothesis that the coefficients of both methods are similar, 
meaning that if it is rejected we must apply fixed effects (Campbell and Mínguez-Vera, 
2008). Besides, we apply robust standard errors in our OLS and panel data regressions 
in order to control for potential heteroskedasticity in the dataset (Wooldridge, 2012). 
We run the following regression models: 
OLS: Yit=β0+β1Xit+β2Zit+εit ; Panel data: Yit=β0+β1Xit+β2Zit+ηi+εit  
As explained previously, our dependent variable (Y) stands for Tobin’s Q or ROA, 
whereas the independent variable (X) denotes Female On Board. Moreover, “Z” refers 
to our control variables, which include a selection of firm and board characteristics. 
There are two types of error terms: “ε” describes the one that varies over time and 
therefore it is included in both models, whilst “η” represents the firm fixed effects, 
which stay constant over time and hence can only be considered in the panel data 
equation. Finally, “i” and “t” stand for firm and time period (in years) respectively. 
3.3 Results and discussion 
Before running the regressions we compute the correlations between the variables in 
order to check for multicollinearity. The pair-wise correlation matrix can take values 
from -1 (perfect negative correlation) to 1 (perfect positive correlation), and it indicates 
multicollinearity whenever this value is too high (e.g. >0,8). 
As observed in Table 2, the correlations between our variables are low in general so 
they do not display any multicollinearity problem. The most significant relation takes 
place between Tobin’s Q and ROA, but this high value was already expected since both 
are proxies for financial performance. Hence, we can include all the variables in the 
regressions. We notice that the number of female directors shows a positive correlation 
with financial performance, and the same trend holds with independent board members 
and firm size. On the other hand, it is not correlated with women employees, whilst 
board size and specific skills are negatively associated with the explanatory variable, as 
predicted in “2.4 Trends”.  
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Table 2. Pair-Wise Correlation Matrix. 
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
 
We present the results of our regressions in Tables 3-5. Thus, in Tables 3 and 4 we 
exhibit how the percentage of women in the boardroom relates to Tobin’s Q and ROA 
respectively, starting by univariate regressions (models 1 and 2) to compare how the 
outcomes differ when undertaking multivariate regressions (models 3 and 4). Yet, in 
Table 5, we perform a robustness check of the previous results based on the research 
carried out by Adams and Ferreira (2009) (models 5 and 6). For all the models, we 
check how the effects vary when controlling for industry and/or year dummy variables. 
In the panel data regressions, we exclude the industry dummies since they are 
redundant, captured by the fixed effects.  
At first glance, the regressions with Tobin’s Q in Table 3 show divergent results 
regarding the coefficient of Female on Board when controlling for the year dummies. 
This could be due to the appreciated decline of Tobin’s Q in the year 201422. Anyway, 
the coefficient of Female On Board appears to be positive in the rest of the cases, and it 
is significant in the multivariate regressions, though at different levels. Therefore, this is 
in line with the results of Campbell and Mínguez-Vera (2008) when analyzing a 
Spanish dataset too.  
As for the control variables, Firm Size as expressed by the value of assets is negatively 
and significantly associated with Tobin’s Q, which implies that large companies in our 
sample have a lower performance than smaller ones. Similarly, the coefficients of 
                                                          
22 See Figure 12 
Variables
Women 
Employees
Board 
Specific 
Skills
Female 
On 
Board
Independent 
Board 
Members
Board Size ROA Tobin's Q Firm Size
Women Employees 1
Board Specific Skills 0,26 1
Female On Board 0,00 -0,16 1
Independent 
Board Members
0,11 -0,11 0,33 1
Board Size 0,04 -0,02 -0,14 -0,33 1
ROA 0,04 0,04 0,12 -0,06 -0,23 1
Tobin's Q -0,05 0,15 0,06 -0,15 -0,35 0,73 1
Firm Size 0,30 0,20 0,09 0,20 0,46 -0,40 -0,46 1
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Independent Board Members and Board Size are also negative, but they are significant 
just in the OLS regressions, which might be due to a lack of variation over time.  
On the contrary, Board Specific Skills has positive coefficients and it turns out to be 
statistically significant. As expected, it is only significant when including the industry 
dummy, meaning that directors’ expertise in the company’s sector is positive when 
controlling for the type of industry.  However, Women Employees is not statistically 
significant, so we reject the hypothesis that a more gender-diverse staff influences the 
company’s market valuation.  
Table 3. Regression results with Tobin’s Q as dependent variable. 
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
 
In Table 4, when we take ROA as the dependent variable, the coefficient of Female On 
Board is positive for all the considered scenarios. Furthermore, it appears to be robust 
and statistically significant at 1% and 5% levels for all multivariate regressions, as well 
as for the first univariate model. Thus, this implies female directors in our sample 
VARIABLES Model 1 Model 1 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3 Model 3
Female on Board 0.00810 -0.00120 0.0220*** 0.0154** 0.0156** 0.00672* -0.000214
(0.00689) (0.00470) (0.00725) (0.00616) (0.00703) (0.00397) (0.00580)
Firm Size -0.266*** -0.144** -0.143** -0.262* -0.254*
(0.0511) (0.0610) (0.0614) (0.139) (0.146)
Board Specific Skills 0.0155 0.0197** 0.0198** 0.00627 0.00572
(0.00980) (0.00891) (0.00917) (0.00542) (0.00578)
Women Employees 0.00823 0.00805 0.00844 -0.000856 -0.00318
(0.0106) (0.00782) (0.00838) (0.00655) (0.00695)
Independent Board 
Members
-0.0107* -0.0152*** -0.0152** -0.00459 -0.00498
(0.00642) (0.00563) (0.00594) (0.00346) (0.00394)
Board Size -0.0726** -0.0485** -0.0478* -0.0152 -0.000519
(0.0331) (0.0232) (0.0250) (0.0173) (0.0144)
4.352***
Constant 1.402*** 1.968*** (0.870) 2.438*** 2.381*** 4.193*** 4.018**
(0.143) (0.234) (0.630) (0.643) -1.525 -1.602
Observations 170 170 149 149 149 149 149
R-squared 0.004 0.447 0.336 0.693 0.695
Industry dummies No Yes No Yes Yes No No
Year dummies No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Regression type OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Random effectsRandom effects
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Tobin's Q
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positively influence firm performance from an accounting perspective, which is 
consistent with the results obtained from Carter et al. (2010) in the US. In particular, our 
panel data regression accounting for year dummies indicates that when the proportion of 
female representation increases by 10 percentage points, ROA is predicted to change by 
about 1,49 percentage points.  
Again, Firm Size is negatively and significantly associated with firm performance, 
whilst Board Specific Skills shows a positive and significant relationship when 
including the industry dummy.  
As before, Women Employees is not statistically significant. Moreover, Independent 
Board Directors and Board Size are not statistically significant either, not even for the 
OLS regressions. 
Table 4. Regression results with ROA as dependent variable. 
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
 
VARIABLES Model 2 Model 2 Model 4 Model 4 Model 4 Model 4 Model 4
Female on Board 0.0902** 0.0685 0.158*** 0.135** 0.149** 0.127** 0.149**
(0.0446) (0.0476) (0.0582) (0.0541) (0.0604) (0.0548) (0.0701)
Firm Size -1.452*** -0.860* -0.866 -1.713*** -1.717***
(0.392) (0.510) (0.538) (0.589) (0.593)
Board Specific Skills 0.0831 0.103* 0.106** 0.0624 0.0689
(0.0520) (0.0531) (0.0513) (0.0479) (0.0472)
Women Employees -0.0246 0.0240 0.0324 -0.0278 -0.0266
(0.0602) (0.0814) (0.0862) (0.0972) (0.0993)
Independent Board 
Members
-0.00818 -0.0408 -0.0473 0.00773 -0.00214
(0.0379) (0.0369) (0.0389) (0.0510) (0.0548)
Board Size -0.0326 0.0785 0.0528 0.208 0.190
(0.323) (0.366) (0.360) (0.318) (0.312)
Constant 3.085*** 7.121*** 14.66*** 4.164 5.554 14.62* 16.09*
(0.834) -1.653 -4.835 -4.992 -5.082 -8.407 -8.570
Observations 167 167 146 146 146 146 146
R-squared 0.015 0.326 0.176 0.450 0.463
Industry dummies No Yes No Yes Yes No No
Year dummies No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Regression type OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS Random effects Random effects
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ROA
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In Table 5, we do not consider Women Employees and Board Specific Skills, as we aim 
at running the same models as Adams and Ferreira (2009)
23
.  
Unlike their results, our sample does not show a significant association between Female 
On Board and Tobin’s Q when we suppress these two control variables, and in 
particular Board Specific Skills. However, we do find a positive and significant 
relationship at a 10% level between Female On Board and ROA. Therefore, this 
suggests that there exists an omitted variable problem. Indeed, when accounting for 
Board Specific Skills (which is negatively correlated with Female On Board) we obtain 
positive and statistically significant coefficients. 
Regarding Board Size, we obtain negative and significant coefficients but only with 
Tobin’s Q and OLS regressions. Thus, whether a smaller or larger board influences firm 
gains in our sample is not clear. 
As for the variable Independent Board Members, they find a positive relationship that is 
just significant with ROA. For us, it is still negative as in the previous tables, but in this 
case significant with Tobin’s Q. This indicates that a smaller number of independent 
board members can add economic value to Spanish firms, but this association is not 
meaningful when controlling for additional variables or considering ROA. 
Finally, Firm Size is again negative and significant in all scenarios, suggesting that 
smaller companies in our sample are the ones performing the best. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23 They consider fewer variables than we do in Models 1-4. Instead of Firm Size expressed as the logarithm of total 
assets they use the logarithm of total sales. They do not control for year dummies either. 
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Table 5. Regression results for the Robustness Check. 
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VARIABLES Model 5 Model 5 Model 5 Model 6 Model 6 Model 6
Female on 
Board
0.00592 0.00556 -0.00227 0.0758 0.0881 0.126*
(0.00421) (0.00482) (0.00414) (0.0515) (0.0570) (0.0641)
Independent 
Board Members
-0.0186** -0.0183** -0.00551** -0.0559 -0.0603 -0.0120
(0.00786) (0.00816) (0.00267) (0.0390) (0.0403) (0.0538)
Board Size -0.0714** -0.0701** -0.00412 -0.0112 -0.0399 0.0983
(0.0276) (0.0305) (0.0122) (0.302) (0.293) (0.321)
Firm Size -0.159*** -0.159*** -0.227* -1.384*** -1.374*** -1.615***
(0.0511) (0.0511) (0.130) (0.424) (0.431) (0.482)
Constant 4.696*** 4.601*** 3.914*** 17.94*** 19.50*** 18.62**
(0.691) (0.757) -1.472 -4.826 -5.130 -8.629
Observations 161 161 161 158 158 158
R-squared 0.587 0.589 0.391 0.401
Industry 
dummies
Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Year dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Regression type OLS OLS Random effects OLS OLS Random effects
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robustness Check: Adams & Ferreira (2009)
Tobin's Q ROA
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we provide new insights into the relationship between women in the 
boardroom and firm performance, by focusing on recent data from Spanish firms listed 
on the Spanish stock market. Thus, we contribute to the literature on this topic by 
analyzing the results obtained from a different sample, period and set of variables.  
As a first approach, we aim at uncovering the characteristics of the few firms in Spain 
which integrate female board members. By examining our sample, we identify two 
remarkable trends that support some of our hypothesis: (1) we observe that women 
directors are usually found in sectors operating close to end customers and (2) they 
appear to be concentrated on companies with small boards.  
Our findings show that in general there exists a positive and significant relationship 
between WOCB and economic performance, which are consistent with those from 
Laffarga et al. (2015), Lückerath-Rovers (2013) and Smith et al. (2005) among others. 
When measuring financial performance by ROA, a positively significant association 
holds in all panel regressions. The same linkage is found when considering Tobin’s Q, 
though the coefficient becomes insignificant when including year dummies. 
After performing the robustness check and obtaining no statistically significant 
relationship, we realize the existence of an omitted variable problem. Indeed, once the 
control variable board specific skills is included, we get positive and significant 
coefficients for female on board. Hence, our results suggest that women directors can 
positively affect firm value once all relevant control variables are accounted for, which 
underpins resource dependence and human capital theory. Furthermore, our outcomes 
also indicate that smaller firms in terms of total assets perform better than larger ones, 
but this may be misleading, due to the fact we are considering banks and insurance 
companies. We could not draw any other conclusion concerning the rest of control 
variables, since the results were not significant and the signs changed depending on the 
chosen financial performance measure.  
Future research on this topic would be highly beneficial to overcome current societal, 
organizational and legislative concerns. Despite we could contribute with some 
substantial outcomes, our study faced some limitations that should be addressed when 
carrying out new approaches. Firstly, there is not a substantial amount of Spanish 
companies that display data on their number of female directors. The lack of time 
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impeded us using other means to obtain a larger sample, but we believe this should be 
one of the main points to be arranged. A larger sample size could also allow performing 
the analysis only on a subsample of non-financial firms, to verify the robustness of our 
results. Secondly, our initial analysis aimed at including many other interesting 
variables, such as the director tenure, board and committee meeting attendance, women 
managers and board cultural diversity among others, which had to be rejected because 
they exhibited many missing values. Similarly, we believe some variables describing 
board members’ level of education and risk-taking would allow for more noteworthy 
results, but again it may be too time-consuming. Overall, these variables may be 
potentially related to the diversity-performance relationship, so we encourage future 
research to consider them. Finally, despite we used a panel data methodology, further 
advanced techniques commonly employed to explore this link were beyond the reach 
for an undergraduate thesis. As stated in previous literature, performing pooled OLS 
and 2SLS regressions implies greater accuracy, as it mitigates the reverse causality 
concern. Therefore, when analyzing the direction of causality, we recommend following 
the path of Adams and Ferreira (2009), Carter et al. (2010) and Laffarga et al. (2015).  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: EU countries regulation of gender balance on corporate 
boards 
Country Quota Other measures 
Austria 35% for supervisory boards by 
2018. It only applies to state-owned 
firms 
Self-regulation 
Belgium 33% for both executives and non-
executives in state-owned and listed 
companies by 2017, as well as in 
listed SMEs by 2019 
Self-regulation 
Bulgaria No No 
Croatia No No 
Cyprus No No 
Czech 
Republic 
No No 
Denmark No Self-regulation, sanction in case 
of not submitting any reporting 
Estonia No No 
Finland No The Corporate Governance Code 
for listed companies 
recommends to have an 
"equitable proportion of both 
sexes" in their boards 
France 40% by 2017 for non-executive 
directors in all large companies 
The AFEP-MEDEF Corporate 
Code of 2011 recommends 
complying with the quota 
Germany 30% for supervisory boards of the 
110 biggest listed companies 
From 2016, the concerned 
companies must self-regulate 
Greece 33% applicable to companies fully 
or partially owned by the State 
Soft and positive actions for the 
public sector 
Hungary No Soft and positive actions for the 
public sector 
Ireland No Soft and positive actions for the 
public sector employment: 40% 
female participation in all state 
boards 
Italy 33% by 2015 for listed and state-
owned companies 
Applicable to both executive and 
non-executive boards 
Latvia No Soft and positive actions for the 
public sector 
Lithuania No No 
Luxembourg No Soft and positive actions, 
recommendation to have an 
appropriate representation of 
both sexes in all boards 
Malta No No 
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Netherlands 30% for large companies Soft mechanism and self-
regulation applying to all boards  
Poland No The Code of good practices 
contemplates for equally 
qualified women. Soft 
mechanism 
Portugal No A government resolution of 
2015 encourages companies to 
attain 30% of the under-
represented sex at their 
administrative bodies by 2018 
Romania No Soft and positive actions for the 
public sector employment 
Slovakia No No 
Slovenia No 40% representation of each sex 
for government representatives 
in all boards. No sanctions. 
Spain 40% by 2015 for large companies, 
no sanctions. 30% recommendation 
for listed companies from 2016 
Soft and positive actions for the 
public sector employment 
Sweden No Self-regulation 
United 
Kingdom 
No Self-regulation 
 
Source: made by the author, based on the report of gender balance on corporate boards 
(European Commission, April 2016). 
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Appendix 2: Variable definition 
Variable name Definition 
ROA (%) Datastream computes Return On Assets as a percentage 
according to each type of firm:  
-Annual Time Series: 
(Net Income – Bottom Line + ((Interest Expense on Debt-
Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / Average of Last 
Year's and Current Year’s Total Assets * 100 
-Banks:  
Net Income  – Bottom Line + ((Interest Expense on Debt-
Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / Average of Last 
Year's (Total Assets - Customer Liabilities on 
Acceptances) and Current Year’s (Total Assets - Customer 
Liabilities on Acceptances) * 100. Customer Liabilities on 
Acceptances only subtracted when included in Total 
Assets 
-Insurance Companies: 
(Net Income – Bottom Line + ((Interest Expense on Debt-
Interest Capitalized) *(1-Tax Rate))) + Policyholders' 
Surplus) / Average of Last Year's and Current Year’s Total 
Assets * 100 
-Other Financial Companies: 
(Net Income – Bottom Line + ((Interest Expense on Debt-
Interest Capitalized) * (1-Tax Rate))) / Average of Last 
Year's (Total Assets - Custody Securities) and Current 
Year’s (Total Assets - Custody Securities) * 100 
 
 
 
Tobin’s Q (Market Capitalization + Total Liabilities)/ Total Assets  
(BV of Debt + Market Capitalization)/ (BV of Equity + 
BV of Debt, where 
Total Liabilities= Total Assets- Book Value of Equity ; 
and BV Equity= BV per share * Number of Shares 
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Female On Board (%) Percentage of Female On Board 
Board Size The total number of board members at the end of the fiscal 
year. 
Independent Board 
Members (%) 
Percentage of independent board members as reported by 
the company 
Board Specific Skills 
(%) 
Percentage of board members who have either an industry 
specific background or a strong financial background 
Women Employees 
(%) 
Percentage of women employees 
Firm Size Logarithm of Total Assets (thousands of Euros), as 
reported by the company. Includes the reported sum of 
total current assets, long term receivables, investment in 
associated companies, other investments, net property 
plant and equipment and other assets  
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
 
Appendix 3: Firms in the sample sorted by sector 
SECTOR FIRM 
COMMUNICATIONS MEDIASET ESPAÑA 
ATRESMEDIA 
 
 
ENERGY 
IBERDROLA 
REPSOL 
ENDESA 
RED ELECTRICA 
GAS NATURAL 
 
 
 
 
 
FINANCE & INSURANCE 
BANCO POPULAR ESPAÑOL 
BANCO SANTANDER 
BANKIA 
BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA 
ARGENTARIA 
CAIXABANK 
MAPFRE 
BANKINTER 
PROSEGUR 
BOLSAS Y MERCADOS 
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HOSPITALITY NH HOTEL GROUP 
 
 
 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
SACYR 
ABERTIS 
FERROVIAL 
ACS ACTIV. CONSTRUC. Y SERV. 
TECNICAS REUNIDAS 
FOMENTO CONSTRUC. Y CNTR. 
ACCIONA 
 
ITC 
TELEFONICA 
CELLNEX 
INDRA SISTEMAS 
 
 
MANUFACTURING 
ACERINOX 
ZARDOYA OTIS 
ARCELORMITTAL 
FAES FARMA 
VISCOFAN 
 
REAL ESTATE 
MERLIN PROPERTIES 
INMOBILIARIA COLONIAL 
TEXTILE INDITEX 
WIND GAMESA 
 
Source: made by the author, based on information downloaded from Datastream 
 
